ANCILLARY REQUEST FOR ACTION – in support of the respondent “OBLIGOR” GRUPUL INDUSTRIAL VOICULESCU AND COMPANIA GRIVCO SA

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MADAM CHAIRWOMAN,

The undersigned Camelia Bogdan, judge within the Bucharest Court of Appeal, in accordance with provisions under art. 158 and art. 162 of Civil Procedure Code, hereby formulate

                                      ANCILLARY REQUEST FOR ACTION

in support of

the respondent “OBLIGOR” GRUPUL INDUSTRIAL VOICULESCU AND COMPANIA GRIVCO SA,

The decision to formulate the request for action herein has been made corollary to having studied the aforementioned case file on 13.01.2020 as to complete the article “Regulatory Arbitrage and Non-Judicial Debt Collection in Central and Eastern Europe – Tax Sheltering and Money Laundering”, subject presented within the conference “SASE Convivum International Conference: Fathomless Futures – Algorithmic and Imagines” held in New-York, USA, June 2019, together with Dr. Cătălin Gabriel Stănescu, the authors having drafted the specialized study regarding money-laundering through disposal of non-accrual loans, activity with repercussions upon the security of the financial-banking system and upon consumers’ protection as well, currently being published in the Journal of Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, Spring, 2020.

In this respect, I have studied the present case file in which, although there is a motion to withdraw, the honorable panel is required, in accordance with the provisions under art. 267 of the Criminal Code, to notify the criminal investigation body as there is reasonable suspicion for money laundering based on GLOBAL LAUNDROMAT scheme, related to moving the money of CRESCENT COMMERCIAL MARITIME LTD FROM THE BANK IN CYPRUS, WHERE MISTER DAN VOICULESCU HAD ACCESS BY MEANS OF THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED IN A DISCRETIONARY MANNER IN 2008, IN ENGLAND, AT A DEUTSCHE BANK SUBSIDIARY, bank involved in money laundering operations, using shell companies and withdrawing from the ONPCSB and BNR supervision through the so-called agreement obtained from the COMPETITION COUNCIL to report losses generated through shadow-banking as so-called losses generated by transfer prices among companies within the same group.

 Ab initio, I specify the procedural interest deriving from avoiding the losses caused by the corollary state budget:

  1. into the transmission – by the money-laundering typology based on the underground banking system – of the so-called “non-accrual receivables” through the securing process undertaken by Alpha Bank Romania S.A. and Alpha Bank A.E. – London branch.
  2. and from the need to guarantee the efficacy of the order granting the compensations/damages due to me, corollary to the resolution of cases no. 6085/299/2019, 6086/299/2019, 6087/299/2019, 3078/299/2019 pending before JS1/Bucharest Court or 2761/117/2019, pending before the Cluj Court, in which the parties are represented by DAN VOICULESCU, true beneficiary of WISE INVEST SRL AND GRIVCO AND HIS COMPANY, funded by CRESCENT COMMERCIAL (CYPRUS) MARITIME LTD, company associated to the former Security, as well as the FACIAS foundation, whose true beneficiary is DAN VOICULESCU, foundation founded by him and Fundatia Umanista DAN VOICULESCU, which controls 90% of CRESCENT COMMERCIAL (CYPRUS) MARITIME LTD, company associated to the former Security and which recognizes mister DAN VOICULESCU as true beneficiary, foundation that had the same procedural office until the year 2016 as the GRIVCO and WISE companies, respectively No. 1B Garlei Street.

In the following, we shall briefly specify why the “CREDITOR” APS CONSUMER IFN SA’s claim is not certain and we shall also specify the evidence on file from which derives the suspicion that the same is a result of money-laundering activities carried out by the true beneficiaries of WISE INVEST SRL.

  1. WITH REGARDS TO THE CLAIM MADE BY THE “CREDITOR” APS CONSUMER IFN SA:

I.1 “THE INITIAL CLAIM” that justifies the motion to initiate the bankruptcy procedure.

By means of the writ of summons, the “CREDITOR” has requested, in contradiction to the “OBLIGOR WISE INVEST SRL”, that the court ruling which is to be given dispose that the OBLIGOR GRIVCO FILE FOR BANKRUPTCY, requesting a “Morfi”-like claim against it, which is not provided in the receivables assumption agreement concluded on January 4th, 2018 (page 140 and the following under case file no. 34387/January 4th, 2018), having as implicated parties Alpha Bank Romania S.A. and Alpha Bank A.E. – London branch, and A1 Carpi Finance S.A., APS Consumer Finance IFN S.A. and APS Delta S.A., as assignees, claim which is neither certain, liquid, nor exigible in determining the bankruptcy of the company WISE INVEST SRL, whose true beneficiary is Dan Voiculescu.

As de facto substantiation of the claim, the “creditor” APS CONSUMER IFN SA has requested filing for bankruptcy for the GRIVCO company, co-obligor of the WISE INVEST SRL company pursuant to art. 72, para. 2 under Law no. 85/2014.

The request is based on a claim associated to Alpha Bank Romania S.A. concluding an agreement for granting a loan facility and not that of granting a loan to the company WISE INVEST SRL.

As such, on 31.03.2008, between WISE INVEST SRL and Alpha Bank Romania S.A. the agreement no. 52/31.03.2008 (case file page no. 40) was concluded, by means of which WISE INVEST SRL benefited from a loan facility in the amount of EUR 2,000,000 for refunding the lands portfolio pertaining to GRIVCO, as true co-obligor and guarantor.

We specify the fact that the object of agreement no. 52/31.03.2008 (page 40 under the case file) does not aim at granting a loan from Alpha Bank Romania S.A. bank’s own funds, but, as can be seen at page 12 of the case file, the object of agreement no. 52/31.03.2018 is that of granting a letter of credit, respectively a commitment issued by the bank at the request of the borrower, in which the bank undertakes to make a payment to the beneficiary and to authorize another bank to make payments, to accept bills of exchange, that is to authorize another bank to proceed as such.

Within the agreement, the “beneficiary” is defined as the beneficiary of a loan product, the client is defined as the fidejusor co-obligor and guarantor borrower, that is GRIVCO, the primary amount representing a facility for refunding the lands portfolio (6 National, Stefan Cel Mare, Bacau, and 1-3 Sf. ATANASIE, Iasi county) by reimbursing the loan granted to GRIVCO.

Several additional documents were concluded between the parties as well, respectively on 10.04.2008 and on 23.05.2008, in order to guarantee the loan, a Ist rank mortgage having been constituted on 10.06.2014 on the real estate located at No. 1 B Garlei Street.

Thereby, with the substantiation “reimbursement of Grivco loan”, another facility in the amount of EUR 2,175,000 was granted through additional documents (P. 52 case file no. 34385/3/2019).

The additional document as of 30.05.2016 can be found at page 107 of the case file 34385/3/2019, additional document through which the “payment day” is stipulated as 31.05.2016, date on which the GRIVCO office is otherwise sold, respectively the real estate located at No. 1B Garlei Street, a product of the ICA offense and confiscated into State ownership by means of decision no. 888/8.08.2014 of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, IInd criminal section. Furthermore, according to the additional document from 26.06.2017, Grivco was registered with its office at No. 1B Garlei Street, even though it had been transfered to state ownership in the year 2014.

It is observed that the case file’s elements do not allow for determining the extent and certitude of the claim associated to the loan facility, nor for determining the banks and accounts from which the money made available to WISE came, funds which do not belong to ALPHA BANK ROMANIA S.A.

With regards to this “claim”, the intervener requires the court to take into account that the reasonable suspicion is met in this case with regards to the existence of typical conditions for the money-laundering typology of FALSE PROCESS (in attempted form), corollary to the attempt to file for bankruptcy, although the CREDITOR does not justify a certain, liquid and exigible claim, as there are money-laundering suspicions regarding the so-called loan which represents the grounds for the TRANSFER OF RECEIVABLES: in order to clarify this suspicion, we request in evidence:

  1. the loan documentation that founded the conclusion of the agreement as of 31.03.2008 between WISE INVEST SRL and Alpha Bank Romania S.A.) and the additional documents, following that the court issue a registered request to Alpha Bank Romania S.A. as to verify the amounts of money that had entered the GRIVCO and WISE accounts based on the financial commitment carried out by Alpha Bank Romania S.A. for mister Dan Voiculescu.
  2. the issuance of a registered request to Alpha Bank Romania S.A. in order to specify the manner in which the principle of know-your-clientèle/reporting of suspicious transactions was fulfilled, transactions constituting the financial arrangement through which mister Dan Voiculescu’s companies had benefited from access to the amounts within the corresponding accounts, masked as a loan, and to specify the amounts that were transferred to the aforementioned companies under this substantiation.
  3. the issuance of a registered request to BNR as to specify how the supervisory activity unfolded in the case of Alpha Bank Romania S.A.’s loan activity, that of the agreement as of 31.03.2008 between WISE INVEST SRL and Alpha Bank Romania S.A. and the agreement from January 4th, 2018.
  4. the loan documentation that founded the conclusion of the agreement as of January 4th, 2018, through which Alpha Bank Romania S.A. and Alpha Bank London Branch transfered the so-called receivables deriving from the loan granted by WISE to certain securitization companies, without fulfilling the principle of know-your-clientèle and of informing the National Office for the Prevention and Fight against Money-Laundering, as well as the additional documents, following that the court issue a registered request to Alpha Bank Romania S.A. as to verify the amounts of money that had entered the GRIVCO and WISE accounts based on the financial commitment carried out by Alpha Bank Romania S.A. for mister Dan Voiculescu by means of this mechanism.

Ab initio, we underline the fact that, with regards to the theoretical aspects which have allowed for certain suspicion indications regarding a potential money-laundering typology through the real estate system, the intervener specifies, with introductory quality, that in the case herewith there are being exploited the vulnerabilities of our system for prevention and effective fight against money laundering, namely its lack of awareness on suspicious indications (red flags) and the lack of proper verification of the scope of the legal report that could have been recognized as apparently legal given the insolvency procedure substantiated by the impossibility of paying debts to the APF, institution which, however, could not legally justify the certitude and extent of the claim to be forwarded to the body of creditors, aspect that can be ascertained by the bankruptcy judge from a comprehensive analysis of the loan documentation.

The intervener reminds of the fact that the typology of the false process (Le faux procès), one of the most seductive and infantile techniques for legalizing dirty money (Éric Vernier, Techniques de blanchiment et moyens de lutte, Ed. Dunod, Paris 2005, p.65-67), concurrently defining the process carried out by means of the courts through which the profits illegally obtained by the criminals receive an appearance of legality – criminals who, without being compromised, subsequently benefit from the amounts obtained, is frequently used in bankruptcy procedures, as well as in other simplified procedures, exempli gratia ordinances/demands for payment.

As is plastically shown in the specialized literature (Éric Vernier, Techniques de blanchiment et moyens de lutte, Ed. Dunod, Paris 2005, p.65-67), the analysis of this typology allows to conclude that justice itself is used as a money-laundering machine. Otherwise stated, the money-laundering offense is stamped by a judge.

Mutatis mutandis, within the present case, the claim according to which bankruptcy is requested derives from the circumstance that the financial institution “lends” money to the borrower who presents, as guarantee, amounts originating from criminal activities. 

Although the financial institutions are required to report such suspicious transactions in certain situations, the analysis of the presented guarantees is performed in a formal manner, eluding the rigors imposed by the rule Know Your Customer that requires enhanced precaution in this respect[1].

In this case, the reasonable suspicion that the interposed entity (WISE INVEST SRL) had implemented a scheme based on granting a back-to-back loan in order to launder the funds gained from criminal activities through investments in real estate and that, after having received the loan, the same obtained a bank commitment between the banks where the two companies had their accounts, stipulating that, in case of non-restitution of the loan, the bank where the managing company had its account would make available the amount within the bank deposit of the borrower-company to the other company, amount generated through criminal activity (the company had its office at No. 1B Garlei Street confiscated through ruling 888/8.08.2014 of the Buchareat Court of Appeal, IInd criminal section, as deriving from criminal activity, gained by GRIVCO and used by WISE as a result of the fraudulent privatization of the former Institute of Food Chemistry).

            Further on, after having emphasized the fact that the money made available to GRIVCO by means of the loan taken by WISE did not belong to Alpha Bank Romania S.A., which only ensured access and availability for mister DAN VOICULESCU, true beneficiary of GRIVCO and WISE, to certain amounts upon request – amounts which could not be established -, we shall continue by specifying the details of the transfer of the so-called claim, that is not certain, to the petitioner APS IFN CONSUMER SA and AnaCap Financial Europe S.A. SICAV-RAIF (“AnaCap”), which was constituted on June 28th, 2017, as to acquire a number of direct and indirect branches from AnaCap Credit Opportunities II Limited and AnaCap Credit opportunities III Limited (including their shares in several loan portfolios) in Luxembourg, Guernsey, Italy and Spain.

I.2 “Securitization of the initial receivable” through shadow-banking and analysis of money-laundering suspicion indications. The lack of creditor quality of the petitioner APS IFN CONSUMER SA.

On January 4th, 2018, the confidential agreement (framework-agreement) for the transfer of receivables was concluded – receivables which refer to an amount of money and certain other rights – (“the Agreement”) between, on the one hand, the Assignors Alpha Bank Romania S.A. (“Assignor 1”) and Alpha Bank A.E. – London Branch (“Assignor 2”) and, on the other hand, A1 Carpi Finance S.A., APS Consumer Finance IFN S.A. and APS Delta S.A., as Assignees.

After having analyzed the case file, the following were ascertained: the amount of transfered receivables is not specified, the extent of which could not be established as to justify filing for bankruptcy.

Furthermore, although the bank was required to report the suspicious transaction to the financial intelligence unit (ONPCSB), in this specific case a choice was made for a receivable transfer, grounded on the provisions of part 1366 of the Civil Code, even though the true beneficiary of A1 CARPI FINANCE S.A., whose primary activity is that of concluding and performing securitization transactions permitted under the Securitization Law as of March 22nd, 2004, Luxembourg (“Securitization Law”), was constituted on December 15th, 2017 by a sole shareholder (which holds 100% of the shares), that is a foundation, Stichting Snowflake Finance (“the Foundation”), constituted in December 2017 according to the laws in The Netherlands, with its registered office at Strawinskylaan 3127, Atrium Building, 8th floor, 1077ZX Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Assignee 1 and its sole shareholder, the Foundation, are independent from the Investors from a legal entity point of view, that is there are no ties at shareholding level between the Investors and the Foundation of Assignee 1.

Likewise, determining the identity of the true beneficiary of the parties involved in transferring said receivable was an obligation incurred by the banks for the fulfillment of the know-your-clientèle principle. Moreover, the banks were required to report all suspicious transactions to ONPCSB.

            In order to verify these reasonable suspicions regarding the existence of money-laundering indications, we are requiring the issuance of registered requests to Alpha Bank Romania S.A. and to the Competition Council as to submit the loan documentation for the agreements concluded on January 4th, 2018 and all the documents that substantiated the economic concentration presented below for the transfer of amounts in the Deutsche Bank – London branch bank accounts, using as justification the intra-group transfer.

I.3. The analysis of suspicions regarding the laundering of the CRESCENT COMMERCIAL & MARITIME (CYPRUS) LIMITED funds through bank transfers masked as investments in the company’s portfolio – financial investments involved in securitization (APS CONSUMER FINANCE IFN S.A.) carried out by Deutsche Bank S.A. – London Branch.

In the following, we will substantiate the reasonable suspicion of money-laundering associated to the bank transfer of funds from Cyprus to London, with the involvement of  Deutsche Bank AG – London Branch, a branch with a rich tradition of transferring KGB funds to Western Europe through a money-laundering typology called “mirror trading”[2]-and of the Competition Council as well, institution whose experts did not have the competence to verify transactions suspicious of money-laundering associated to transfer of non-accrual loans originating from transactions suspicious of money-laundering and who did not notify the supicious operation to the criminal investigation body.

As such, likewise on January 4th, 2018, the AGREEMENT between the Investors Deutsche Bank AG – London branch, AnaCap Financial Europe S.A. SICAV-RAIF and APS Investments S.à.r.l (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Investors”) and the assignors A1 Carpi Finance S.A., APS Consumer Finance IFN S.A. and APS Delta S.A. (the “Agreement”) was concluded, having as object the receivables and real estate portfolio held by Alpha Bank Romania S.A. (“Assignor 1”) and Alpha Bank A.E. – London branch (“Assignor 2”), collectively referred to as “Assignors”.

The agreement between the “Investor” Deutsche Bank AG – London Branch was subjected to the approval of the Competition Council, being sealed through DECISION no. 16 as of 03.04.2018 regarding the economic concentration performed through  Deutsche Bank AG – London Branch, AnaCap Financial Europe S.A. SICAV-RAIF and APS Investments S.à.r.l. for gaining indirect shared control over a portfolio of receivables and real estate held by Alpha Bank Romania S.A. and Alpha Bank A.E. – London branch, even though the supervision of the operability of the securitization companies with loan activities was the responsibility of BNR, these companies being, moreover, required to notify the suspicious transactions to ONPCSB.

Therefore, from the analysis of the aforementioned decision, on 11.01.2018, the notification form was submitted to the Competition Council by means of a legal representative, registered under no. RS-02/11.01.2018, regarding the economic concentration operation which was to be carried out by Deutsche Bank AG – London Branch, AnaCap Financial Europe S.A. SICAV-RAIF and APS Investments S.à.r.l. (collectively referred to “Investors”) in order to gain indirect shared control over a portfolio of receivables and real estate held by Alpha Bank Romania S.A. (“Assignor 1”) and Alpha Bank A.E. – London branch (“Assignor 2”), hereinafter referred to as “Assignors”.

(2) The operation was performed based on the Framework-Agreement for the transfer of receivables which have as object an amount of money and certain rights (“Agreement”) between, on the one hand, the Assignors and, on the other hand, A1 Carpi Finance S.A., APS Consumer Finance IFN S.A. and APS Delta S.A., as Assignees, concluded on January 4th, 2018 and the agreement concluded between the Investors and the Assignors (the “Agreement”) on the same date.

(3) The notified operation falls under the scope of Competition Law no. 21/1996, republished, with subsequent amendments and completions. The notified operation is an economic concentration operation in line with the provisions under art. 9 para. (1) letter b of the Competition Law no. 21/1996, republished, with subsequent amendments and completions, which exceeds the value thresholds stipulated under art. 12 of the same law.

Investors

Deutsche Bank AG – London branch1 (“DB”) is part of the Deutsche Bank Group (“DB Group”) which offers a wide range of products and services in the investments sector, in shareholding and retail banking as well as in asset and real estate management. DB Group is present in Europe, North America and Asia.

In Romania, the above mentioned carries out its activity through the following entities/structures:

(i) Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, Repräsentanz Bukarest3 (agency), which does not carry out any commercial activity, mainly performing:

  • Establishing meetings with the DB personnel who visit Romania;
  • Translation of DB documents in Romanian as to be used by Romanian DB clients;
  • Making comprehensive analyses on Romania available to DB clients (for ex.: macroeconomic data, information regarding the business environment, banking sector etc.)
  • Promoting the activity in Romania before DB clients (for example, by preparing the participation of Romanian clients to DB events held abroad (such as DB conferences)).

(ii) The main scope of DB Global Technology SRL4 is information technology consultancy, the notifying part declaring that these services are offered only at a intra-group level and not for third parties.

AnaCap Financial Europe S.A. SICAV-RAIF5 (“AnaCap”) was incorporated on June 28th, 2017, as to acquire a number of direct and indirect branches from AnaCap Credit Opportunities II Limited and AnaCap Credit opportunities III Limited (including their shares in several loan portfolios) in Luxembourg, Guernsey, Italy and Spain.

APS Investments S.à.r.l6 („APS”) is a company that belongs to the APS Group which, according to the notifying party, acts solely as an instrument in the current context, the investment being made by APS Group.

The APS group was set up in 2004 in the Czech Republic and Poland, with the purpose to carry out service activities rendered in relation to the non-accrual loans (receivables) acquired from the aforementioned states. Subsequently, APS initiated debt collection activities in Poland, Romania (as of 2007), Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia.

Currently, in Romania, the APS group carries out the following activities: (i) debt management; (ii) debt collection; (iii) estimation and assessment of assets; (iv) investment services.

We are also mentioning the fact that the APS Group is the subject of a restructuring process proceeded in January 2018, among its effects being a series of changes of the denominations of certain companies within the group, such as APS Holding a.s. which was renamed APS Recovery a.s.  Business Center Upground Bd. No. 6A Dimitrie Pompeiu, District 2, 1st floor, 020337 Bucharest, ROMANIA J40/10845/2013, SRN 32193007.

Assignees

A1 CARPI FINANCE S.A.7 („Assignee 1”) has as primary scope/object of activity the conclusion and carrying out of securitization transactions allowed for on the basis of the Securitization Law as of March 22nd, 2004, Luxembourg (the “Securitization Law”).

Assignee 1 was constituted on December 15th, 2017, by a sole shareholder (which holds 100% of the shares), i.e. a foundation called Stichting Snowflake Finance (“the Foundation”), constituted in December 2017 according to the laws in The Netherlands, with its registered office at Strawinskylaan 3127, Atrium Building, 8th floor, 1077ZX Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Assignee 1 and its sole shareholder, the Foundation, are independent from the Investors from a legal entity point of view, that is there are no ties at shareholding level between the Investors and the Foundation of Assignee 1.

APS CONSUMER FINANCE IFN S.A.8 (“Assignee 2”) is a non-banking financial institution which functions in accordance with the Romanian laws and its primary object is NACE 6492 – Other loan activities. The current structure of the Assignee 2’s shareholding is made up by: APS Capital Group S.R.O. (99.963%) and Asset Portofolio Servicing Romania S.R.L. (0.037%).

APS DELTA S.A.9 (“Assignee 3”) is 100% held by APS Investment Funds S.à.r.l. (Luxembourg), a limited liability company, with its registered office at Rue Piret no. 1, L-2350 Luxembourg, registered under the Trade Registry in Luxembourg with no. B219886. APS Delta was constituted with the purpose of executing one or more activities regulated by the Securitization Law.

For the present operation, Assignee 3 acts in the name and on behalf of the Mars Department.

Target-portfolio

The Target Portfolio includes (i) Receivables (alongside the attached guarantees, if applicable) and (ii) Real Estate.

The Target Portfolio is divided into 2 sub-portfolios, respectively (i) Portfolio 1 and (ii) Portfolio 2.

  1. Portfolio 1 may be classified as follows:
  2. The type of transferred loans – % from the total of the loans transferred within the Target Portfolio are represented by Non-accrual loans (classified as “loss” in accordance with the BNR standards).
  3. According to the type of guarantees attached to the transferred loans:
  • Real estate mortgage:

– % represents the value of the guarantee from the complete exposure of the Target Portfolio;

– % of the total guarantees comprised within/under the Target Portfolio.

  • Movable mortgage:

– % represents the value of the guarantee from the complete exposure of the Target Portfolio;

– % of the total guarantees comprised within/under the Target Portfolio.

  • Personal guarantees:

– % represents the value of the guarantee from the complete exposure of the Target Portfolio;

– % of the total guarantees comprised within/under the Target Portfolio.

  • Other guarantee funds (SME Guarantee Fund, legal guarantees, shareholding guarantees):

– % represents the value of the guarantee from the complete exposure of the Target Portfolio;

– % of the total guarantees comprised within/under the Target Portfolio.

By the type of assignee clients:

  • Legal entities (% of the total loans transferred within the Target Portfolio), of which:

– Large company clients19 – % of the total loans transferred within the Target Portfolio;

– Small and Medium Enterprises20 – % of the total loans transferred within the Target Portfolio.

  1. Portfolio 2 may be classified as follows:
  2. The type of transferred credits – % from the total of loans transferred within the Target Portfolio are represented by Non-accrual loans (classified as “loss” in accordance with the BNR standards).
  3. According to the type of guarantees attached to the transferred loans:
  • Real estate mortgage:

– % represents the value of the guarantee from the complete exposure of the Target Portfolio;

– % of the total guarantees comprised within/under the Target Portfolio.

  • Movable mortgage:

– % represents the value of the guarantee from the complete exposure of the Target Portfolio;

– % of the total guarantees comprised within/under the Target Portfolio.

  • Personal guarantees:

– % represents the value of the guarantee from the complete exposure of the Target Portfolio;

– % of the total guarantees comprised within/under the Target Portfolio.

  • Other guarantee funds (SME Guarantee Fund, legal guarantees, shareholding guarantees):

– % represents the value of the guarantee from the complete exposure of the Target Portfolio;

– % of the total guarantees comprised within/under the Target Portfolio.

iii. By the type of assignee clients:

  • Legal entities (100% of the total loans transferred within the Target Portfolio), of which:

– Large company clients – % of the total loans transferred within the Target Portfolio;

– Small and medium enterprises – %

Notwithstanding, taking into consideration the Recommendation no. 24 FATF, with the marginal denomination Transparency and the True Beneficiary of the Legal Entities, the countries must take measures in order to prevent the use of legal entities for money-laundering and terrorism funding. The countries must ensure that there is adequate, correct and timely information regarding the true beneficiary and the one that controls the legal entities, which may be obtained and accessed by the competent authorities in real-time. Particularly, the countries that have legal entities which can issue bearer shares or bearer share mandates or that allow designated shareholders or directors, must undertake efficient measures as to ensure that they are not used in an abusive manner for money-laundering and terrorism funding. The countries must take measures as to facilitate access to information regarding the true beneficiary or the one that is in control of the financial institutions or DNFBP by which the requirements provided under Recommendations 10 and 22 are incurred, and according to Recommendation no. 25 FATF, with the marginal denomination Transparency and the true beneficiary of the legal commitments, the countries must take measures in order to prevent the use of legal entities for money-laundering and terrorism funding. The countries must ensure that there is adequate, correct and timely information regarding express trusts, including information regarding the founder, administrator and beneficiaries, which may be obtained or accessed by the competent authorities in real-time. The countries must take measures as to facilitate access to information regarding the true beneficiary or the one that is in control of the financial institutions or DNFBP by which the requirements provided under Recommendations 10 and 22 are incurred.

Concurrently, according to Recommendation no. 18 FATF, with the marginal denomination Internal Controls and Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries, the financial institutions must be required to implement programs that fight against money-laundering and the funding of terror acts. The financial groups should be required to implement programs at group level for the fight against money-laundering and funding of terror acts, including policies and procedures for the transmission of information within the group, with the purpose of CSB/CFT. The financial institutions should be required to ensure that majority-owned branches and subsidiaries apply the know-your-clientèle measures, compliant with obligations in the host country that implements the FATF Recommendations by means of the programs of the anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorism funding group, and according to FATF Recommendation no. 19, with the marginal denomination High-risk Countries, the financial institutions should be required to apply consolidated know-your-clientèle measures in the case of business relationships and transactions with natural persons and legal entities carried out between countries for which this is requested by the FATF. The applied consolidated know-your-clientèle measures must be effective and adequate in relation to the risks. The countries should be capable of applying adequate counteraction measures when the FATF so requests. The countries should be capable of applying counteraction measures independently of any FATF requests. Such counteraction measures must be effective and adequate in relation to the risks.

In question, for the clarification of the “nature of the investment” made by Deutsche BANK LONDON BRANCH in “Alpha Bank ROMANIA S.A.”, with regards to which there exists reasonable suspicion that it only took place as to allow for the substantiation of the transfer of funds to the true beneficiary of WISE INVEST SRL/GRIVCO in England, we request that notifications be issued to:

– Deutsche BANK Romania and Deutsche BANK LONDON BRANCH as to submit the entire documentation pertaining to the contract as of January 4th, 2018, and to clarify the manner in which the know-your-clientèle principle was fulfilled in relation to the aforementioned transaction.

– Alpha Bank Romania and Alpha Bank LONDON BRANCH as to submit the entire documentation pertaining to the contract as of January 4th, 2018, and to clarify the manner in which the know-your-clientèle principle was fulfilled in relation to the aforementioned transaction.

– The Competition Council, as to submit all documentation pertaining to the ruling of DECISION no. 16 as of 03.04.2018 regarding the economic concentration operation carried out by Deutsche Bank AGA – London Branch, AnaCap Financial Europe S.A. SICAV-RAIF and APS Investments S.à.r.l. for gaining shared indirect control over a receivables and real estate portfolio held by Alpha Bank Romania S.A. and Alpha Bank A.E. – London Branch.

The proof of evidence derives from the desideratum of the company members for criminals not to be able to make use of all possibilities offered by the market economy for criminal purposes or to transfer the criminal proceeds determined through final criminal convictions of the true beneficiary of the GRIVCO and WISE companies and for all movable and immovable assets to be transferred into state ownership.

  1. WITH REGARDS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ANCILLARY REQUEST FOR ACTION FORMULATED BY THE UNDERSIGNED:

The present ancillary request for action complies with all the conditions provided under art. 61 and 63 of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to the bankruptcy procedure, with the purpose to prevent the misappropriation of the bankruptcy procedure in view of money-laundering.

According to art. 61 para. 1) of the Civil Procedure Code, any party that has interest may intervene within a procedure in which the initial parties are tried and, in accordance with para. 3) under the same article, the intervention is ancillary when it only supports the defense of one of the parties.

            Concurrently, in accordance with art. 63, para. 2) of the Civil Procedure Code, the ancillary intervention may be made before the closure of debates, during trial, even through extraordinary legal remedies.

            The Intervener is a judge specialized in the fight against high-level money-laundering and corruption, having received numerous distinctions in this respect:

– the intervener is an expert of the European Commission and a Doctor of Law, having recovered over EUR 500 million for the Romanian State, having patented in practice confiscation from third parties, including seizing the accounts of the former Security (CRESCENT COMMERCIAL MARITIME (CYPRUS) LTD) which constantly transferred funds for the funding of the real estate property at No. 1B Garlei Street belonging to GRIVCO, real estate transferred into state ownership through decision no. 888/8.08/2014 and

– the intervener was excluded from the Magistracy for having protected the financial interests of the European Union at the request of the true beneficiary of GRIVCO, and as such, the interest of intervening in the present case is evident: equally true is the fact that, aside from the prevention of money laundering through the securitization process, our interest in avoiding losses caused by crimes committed by mister DAN VOICULESCU’s companies derives from the need to recover legal expenses / due damages/ compensations from the aforementioned, following that we request before the civil courts the attachment of the documentation that founded the elaboration of the case file herein as to analyze the opportunity of seizing the goods whereby true beneficiary is mister DAN VOICULESCU, among which there is also the “obligor WISE”.

– moreover, the interest in unmasking DEUTSCHE BANK’s role and revealing the money of the former Security through GLOBAL LAUNDROMAT typology is our research subject within WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, as DEUTSCHE BANK HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN MULTIPLE MONEY-LAUNDERING SCANDALS AND WE WISH TO HELP MISTER DAN VOICULESCU NOTIFY THE DOJ, the aforementioned having the possibility to obtain the protection offered by FRANK-SODD ACT 2012 and to obtain up to 35 percent of the money-laundering criminal proceeds, even if he had chosen the most rudimentary type of money transfer in the WEST, patented by the former KGB and known as GLOBAL LAUNDROMAT.

– furthermore in question, GRIVCO, having the same office as FACIAS UNTIL 2016, office which should have been transferred into state ownership, has incurred expenses with payment of bail and mister DAN VOICULESCU is asking me for money, being in a financial impediment.

For these reasons, in accordance with art. 64 para. 2) under the Civil Procedure code, we request the admission in principle of the ancillary request for action and the notification of the criminal investigation body on the fact that, in the case hereof, GRIVCO has managed the respective credit facility as a loan with the criminal proceeds being returned by ANABI and that the same holds 4 other properties in its portfolio that are to be transferred to companies whose true beneficiary is unknown.

I am stating the fact that I reserve the right to specify the intervention herein after having available the loan documentation related to the loan facility in 2008 and to the transfer of money from CYPRUS TO ENGLAND in 2018.

Procedural aspects

Competences: according to provisions under art. 63 para. 2) of the Civil Procedure Code, the ancillary intervention may be made before the closure of debates, during trial, even through extraordinary legal remedies.

Evidence: as to support the request herein, we ask for permission to use documentary evidence.

We submit the request herein in 3 copies, one for the courts and two for communication through SALCUDEAN SI ASOCIATII law office.

[1] C. Bogdan, ”Tipologii de spălare a banilor si de finanţare a terorismului prin intermediul sectorului imobiliar”(Money laundry typologies and terrorism financing through real estate sector), Curierul Fiscal nr.9/2008, p.34

[2] https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/deutsche-bank-mirror-trades-and-more-russian-threads

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